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Summary 
The paper examines the tax-tariff reform, recommended for Ukraine by donor 
organization (IMF and the World Bank), which consists in trade liberalization by way 
of trade tax cuts with simultaneous compensation of state tax revenue losses by VAT 
base broadening. We developed the mathematical model of evaluation of cross-
border taxation influence on commodity flows, on economic agents’ profits and on 
state tax revenues, which can be considered as extension of “Devarajan” and 
“Emran–Stiglitz” models, with regard to possibility of tax evasion and receiving the 
illegally compensated VAT.  
The evaluation of model using data bases, prepared by Ukrainian State Statistic 
Committee and Customs administration of Ukraine, revealed that the expediency to 
reform a tax-tariff system, according to the IMF recommendations, is not clearly 
obvious and it depends on tax rates elasticity of size of informal sector. 
We find that providing the trade liberalization by way of substitution of trade 
tax revenues by enlarged VAT is expedient in those branches of economy, which are 
characterized by monopoly and oligopoly situation.  
 
JEL Codes: C30, F13, H26 
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I Introduction 
One of the main functions of donor organizations (IMF and the World Bank) is 
the work with developing counties
3
 to help them achieve macroeconomic stability 
and reduce poverty. They require the fulfillment of definite conditions in exchange 
for financial resources. 
According to the IMF requirements, the main directions of structural reforms in 
Ukraine are tax reform, infrastructure reform, public service and social sector reform. 
Tax reform includes the VAT reform, excises and trade tax reform. Trade tax reform 
supposes reducing of their rates. 
Thereat the experts of donor organizations suggest that to minimize the 
negative impact of tax reform on state tax revenues, the trade tax rates cuts should be 
accompanied by VAT base broadening with significant reducing of tax preferences. 
The impact of trade liberalization on tariff revenue is also determined by the extent of 
exemptions and preferences, and tariff revenue would increase to the extent that 
exemptions are reduced or abolished. Incentives to smuggle or misrecord would be 
reduced if tariffs were lowered or consolidated in the interest of greater transparency, 
thereby improving compliance and broadening the tax base (Elborgh–Woytek et al., 
2006). 
According to the experts, such a policy leads to rising of national welfare and 
state tax revenue. Experience suggests that VAT systems complying with standard 
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According with the IMF Classification (2012), for instance Ukraine is the developing economy. 
best practice of a single base, a reasonable threshold, and few exceptions, were best 
geared toward offsetting lost trade tax revenue (Lorie, 2003). 
The World Bank experts recommend similar measures are recommended also 
by World Bank experts, noting that trade taxes are not optimal instruments to achieve 
a revenue objective because they significantly distort production and consumption 
choices. Preferred instruments to raise revenue are taxes such as income taxes or 
commodity taxes (excise, VAT, etc.). These are preferred taxes because, since they 
are applied neutrally to domestically produced and imported goods, they impose less 
distortion or inefficiency costs (Tarr, 2000). 
The IMF recommendation for Ukraine are in that stream. In 1998, Ukraine 
signed with IMF the Memorandum of еconomіc рolіcіes, which stated the main 
directions of reform in Ukraine for the long-term. In particular, this memorandum 
determined the significant import tariff cuts. 
Hereafter, in Ukraine-IMF Memorandum, signed in 2004, the tax reform was 
determined as a centerpiece of Ukrainian structural reform. The main goals of the 
former were to lower the tax burden, to reduce a number of interventions in the tax 
system, to assure the equal rights to the taxpayers, to reduce the size of informal 
economy. Also some VAT preferences (particularly, in home construction and 
pharmacy) were to be eliminated. 
Likewise, the government engaged does not introduce the new tax preferences 
and to set a moratorium, related to creation of new free economic zones and to 
enlargement of the existing ones. In 2010 IMF approved the loan for Ukraine to 
provide the needed reforms, in particular, reforms designed to achieving the fiscal 
sustainability. These reforms will support efforts to broaden the tax base. 
But the new Ukrainian Tax Code introduces new tax holidays for small 
enterprises and specific industries (hotels, shipbuilding and aerospace industry), and a 
3-year VAT exemption for several sectors that are subject to significant VAT refund 
fraud. The IMF experts note that while the overall revenue impact of these measures 
is likely to be small, they bring unwelcome distortions, add to existing exemptions, 
and break the VAT chain (IMF report, 2011). 
It should be noted that IMF recommendations for Ukraine look as requirement 
to adopt the pattern of foreign trade policy, the centerpiece of which is the quick trade 
liberalization by way of cutting of maximum possible number of tariff barriers. 
But in case of quick trade liberalization, the domestic economic agents can 
hope only to opposite concessions from the part of foreign partners, which will 
permit to Ukrainian enterprises (which will be met the heightened competition), to 
operate freely in the world markets. Trade liberalization may create competition, but 
it does not do so automatically. If trade liberalization occurs in an economy with a 
monopoly importer then rents may just be transferred from the government to the 
monopolist, with little decrease in price. Trade liberalization is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for creating a competitive and innovative economy (Stiglitz, 1998). 
Therefore, in this case the key factor, defining the gains and losses after trade 
liberalization, mainly due to import tariff cuts, is the capability of government to 
favor for domestic competition. 
The basic argument to use such policy is to substantial distortional effect of 
trade tax as tool of rising the state tax revenues (it distorts both producer and 
consumer prices). While the consumption tax, similar to VAT, has a number of 
positive characteristics, for example the alleviation of excessive protection of 
domestic producer from imported substitutes. 
Simultaneously, for instance Ukraine faces with the problem of informal 
economy. Despite a number of actions, taking for the purpose of unshadowing the 
national economy, a large part of it belongs to the informal sector. Such conditions 
show that the increase of VAT or production taxes, necessary to neutralize the 
changes in consumer/producer prices, can be performed only in the case if the good is 
produced or/and processed and sold in formal sector of economy. Those constraints 
determine the situation where such neutral (in respect to consumer/producer prices) 
can reduce both the state tax revenues and national welfare. In those circumstances 
the number of goods, destined to increase of VAT, is limited because of large 
informal sector; and the trade tariff cuts can lead to mentioned consequences. 
In this case the levying of import tariff permits the indirect taxation of 
imported resources, which are used in production in informal sector; in such a way 
the distortions, appeared as a result of limited VAT incidence, reduce. 
Besides, the imperfection of tax administration system itself in Ukraine can 
lead to no gains after trade-tax reform, because the administrative costs can exceed 
the possible gains from moving to broaden VAT base (with simultaneous trade taxes 
cuts). 
Therefore, on one side, the maximum possible trade tax cuts in Ukraine will 
lead to maximum openness of country’s home market. How far those consequences 
are gainful for Ukraine at actual level of economic development and for Ukrainian 
economy’s competitiveness is the debating point, but the fact that the openness of 
Ukrainian market is gainful for developed countries, which established the IMF 
strategy, is undoubtful. This refers to possibility of market development for products, 
which are more competitive than the products of Ukrainian home market, and also to 
possibility of buying the raw materials at law prices. 
At the same time, the some constraints, reflecting the real situation in 
Ukrainian economy, notably, the large informal sector, existence of non-traded and 
intermediate goods; different administrative costs of levying of different taxes; 
existence of smuggling and cross-border shoppіng, can complicate the problem of 
partial shifting from taxes, levied at the border, to taxes, levied domestically. 
Therefore, the question concerning expediency of providing such policy in Ukraine 
remains undetermined. 
The paper is organized as follows. 
Section II includes the literature review concerning the theoretical and 
empirical investigations, related to providing tax-tariff reform. Section III contains 
the model specification. Quantitative evaluation of the model is given in Section IV. 
 
II Literature review 
An analysis of trade taxes and VAT in developing countries, which takes into 
account the considerable informal sector in economy, and also consequences of tax-
tariff reform in countries with different levels of income, taking into account the costs 
of tax administration (Munk (2008)), was done by modern economists. 
A trade tax cuts with a compensating or revenue-enhancing increase in value-
added tax (henceforth VAT) has been the center-piece of such a reform, and it has 
been implemented in a large number of developing countries under the structural 
adjustment and stabilization policy conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank. 
The VAT and withholding taxes and their role in informal sector in the frame 
of small open economy were studied by Keen (2007). He finds the conditions under 
which a VAT alone is fully optimal, precisely because it is in part a tax on informal 
sector production. But they are restrictive: in particular, the author concludes that 
efficient tax structure requires deploying both a VAT and withholding taxes. 
Boadway and Sato (2007) examined the similar problem. Using an optimal 
commodity tax approach they compared trade taxes and VATs when some goods are 
produced informally. The authors find that VAT can achieve production efficiency 
within the formal sector, but unlike the trade tax regime, it cannot indirectly tax pure 
profits. Changing of informal sector size (due to government’s enforcement) may 
also tilt the balance in favor of the VAT. 
Theoretical researches, made by Stiglitz and Shahe Emran (2004, 2005, 2007), 
showed when there is no informal sector, such a reform can yield double dividend in 
the sense that it increase both revenue and welfare and such a reform is as likely to 
reduce both welfare and revenue when the existence of a large informal and shadow 
economy in developing countries is taken into account. They have focused on a 
revenue-neutral reform of VAT and trade tax in the presence of a large informal 
economy, particularly in the context of developing countries. They have analyzed 
both a revenue-neutral selective reform of VAT and trade tax on the existing bases 
and a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction in trade taxes. They 
have shown that then the choice of the commodity for VAT increase is restricted by 
the existence of a large informal sector, the standard policy reform can reduce 
welfare. However, the models model used in those papers ignore smuggling, 
differential administrative costs of different taxes etc. 
Ligthart and van der Meijden (2010) continued investigations in this area. They 
studied the revenue, efficiency, and distributional implications of a simple strategy of 
offsetting tariff reductions with increases in destination-based consumption taxes in a 
small open developing economy with informal sector which cannot be taxed. Taking 
into account the dynamic effects of taxes and tariffs on factor markets, as opposed to 
Emran and Stiglitz (2005), the authors find that existing generations benefit more 
than future generations, who – depending on pre-existing tax and tariff rates and the 
informal sector size – even may become worse off. 
Some empirical estimations of fiscal impact of trade reform on public revenue 
are considered in Devarajan et al. (1999), and Keen and Baunsgaard (2005). 
Devarajan et al. (1999) using a tax model of an open economy provided a 
method for estimating the fiscal impact of trade reform. They used the data on 60 
countries all over the world at 1987. Basic parameters of model were size of tariff 
cuts, the response of imports to the tax change and the relative importance of import 
tariffs as a source of government revenue. Both values of elasticites have to be 
greater than 20 before revenue growth becomes really positive. 
Keen and Baunsgaard (2005), using an econometrical model, estimated the 
influence of trade liberalization on government revenue. This paper used panel data 
for 111 countries over 25 years. High-income countries clearly have recovered from 
other sources the revenues they have lost from trade liberalization. For middle-
income countries, recovery has been in the order of 45–60 cents for each dollar of 
lost trade tax revenue. However, revenue recovery has been extremely weak in low-
income countries: they have recovered, at best, no more than about 30 cents of each 
lost dollar. Nor is there much evidence that the presence of a value-added tax has in it 
made it easier to cope with the revenue effects of trade liberalization. 
Piggott and Whalley (1999) have constructed simple numerical examples of a 
general equilibrium economy, where a VAT base broadening reduces welfare 
because of supply side substitutions toward informal and home production (self 
supply). Results from calibration of their model to the data from Canada have shown 
that the base broadening of VAT has, in fact, reduced aggregate efficiency. Their 
analysis was confined to the implications of an informal sector for a VAT base 
broadening. 
In this context the given paper aims to discover the influence of trade taxes and 
VAT on commodity flows, profits of economic agents and state tax revenues in 
developing economy with large informal sector, which size can change. 
III Model specification 
The model was built up according to the following hypothesis: the expediency 
of compensation of state revenue losses from trade tax cuts due to rising of VAT real 
rate depends on trade tax and VAT rates elasticity (further –tax rates elasticity) of 
informal sector sizes. Tax rates elasticity here is understood to be a measurement of 
how changing the tax rates affects the changing of informal sector size. 
This refers to the IMF and the World Bank recommendations, concerning the 
providing of tax-tariff reform, which can assure the “non-reduction” of state revenue 
only with direct anti-evasion measures (to reduce smuggling, VAT manipulations 
etc.) as a whole. 
It should be noted that the given hypothesis does not consider the different 
elasticity for each tax in the informal sector; the proposed model is based on the 
assumption (feasible for Ukrainian economy), that the intention of the taxpayer to 
evade tax is influenced not by the tax type but by amount of all his tax liabilities. 
It is provided the development of a theoretical model, empirical robustness of 
which will be examined by the example of Ukraine. 
Input Data 
structure of commodity import and export of Ukraine; 
current trade taxes and VAT rates; 
current level of smuggling; 
production of goods of low and high processing; 
average rate of return and added cost. 
The main parameters of the model, which has a crucial importance for its 
empirical calibration, are the figures of real and financial sectors of economy. 
Main data sources: 
official data prepared by Customs administration of Ukraine concerning the structure 
of commodity import and export of Ukraine and their volumes and the trade taxes rates; 
official data prepared by Ministry of Finance of Ukraine about current VAT rates and 
appropriate preferences and exemptions; 
official data given by Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine and 
National Institute for Strategic Studies concerning tendencies of informal sector in 
Ukraine, which include the estimations of Ukrainian informal sector by different 
methods (the physical input (electricity) method, the currency demand approach etc.); 
official statements concerning the level of smuggling. The official statistical data for 
this parameter are absent, but people concerned the subject know very well how 
many goods are transported across the state border illegally. 
official data given by Ukrainian State Statistic Committee about values of added costs by 
branches. 
The input data are presented in appendix А (table А1). 
At once it should be noted that the given model is not the instrument of 
forecasting of changes in external trade of Ukraine, but it is designed for analysis of 
trade tax and VAT influence on external trade, state tax and economic agents’ 
revenues in presence of the informal sector. 
Economy is characterizing by the following. 
1. The economy is presented by two managing agents – by government 
which is authorized to set and levy taxes, and enterprises which produce goods, 
participate in foreign trade and pay taxes. 
2. There is a middle openness of national economy (active participation of 
producers in international trade, but no influence on prices in world market). 
3. There is a different tax rates elasticity of commodity flow (export and 
import, raw materials and finished products) in foreign trade. 
4. A home country market is able to consume all offered goods (i.e. change 
of volumes of imported goods does not influence essentially on volumes of 
consumption of the domestic goods). 
5. There were two types of levied taxes in economy – VAT, levied on 
domestic consumption and commodity import, and also trade taxes, levied on 
commodity export and import. In contrast to “Devarajan model”, which used only 
import tariffs, in calculations in proposed model, we’ll use also export taxes. That is 
the requirement for characterizing the raw-oriented economies, including Ukraine
4
. 
6. VAT on export is levied according to the destination principle. 
7. Proposed model takes into account the possibility of agents’ 
opportunistic behavior, which in the given case consists in tax evasion (smuggling, 
VAT manipulations). Belonging to formal sector is defined in given model as a zero 
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 The assumptions 4, 5 (like some other ones) are used for model simplification and they can be 
excluded in further research. 
tax evasion; any evasion, differing from zero is regarded as belonging to informal 
sector. This implies that there are state tax revenues, collected in informal sector.  
Smuggling in the informal sector (k): 
       
where  denotes the existence of smuggling (the good crosses the border 
without paying any taxes);  means the partial tax payment when the good 
crosses the border.  means that all cross-border taxes are paid. In the formal 
sector . 
Distinction in kind of proposed model from ones developed by Devarajan and 
also Emran and Stiglitz lies in introduction of possibility of tax evasion (opportunistic 
behavior) in concerned economy, namely the introduction of parameter “smuggling”, 
taking into account the possibility of illegal agents’ profit, proceeded from VAT 
manipulations. 
8. The informal sector, in turn, consists of: 
а) enterprises, paying domestic VAT and cross-border taxes, besides 
 (i.e., if VAT is fully paid, there should be a trade tax evasion (  
b) enterprises, do not paying the domestic VAT, but paying cross-border taxes, 
besides . 
9.  All profits, received in informal sector, are exported. 
The assumption about direct correlation between values of tax evasion and 
changes of tax rates was suggested based on a number of existing studies, which 
confirm such type of correlation (see for example N. Loyaza (1996); С. Kuchta-
Helbling et al. (2000); F. Schneіder and D. Enste (2000); R. Klіnglmaіr and 
F. Schneіder (2004)). 
The model of commodity flows in merchandise trade and domestic economy 
operates the set of values, which are presented in Table 1. 
Thus, in given model the economy is structured on industries working mainly 
on export and domestic production (the high processing and law processing goods are 
distinguished). Thus, in comparison with “Devarajan model”, which operates with 
standard 1-2-3 model that separates the economy into three distinct goods: export, 
imports and non-traded goods, the presented one substantially enlarges the set of 
branches. This is also a principal improvement (with respect to economies, which 
export principally raw materials) in comparison with “Emran-Stiglitz model”, which 
considers only abstract sets of exportable and importable commodities. 
Also, proposed model looks more attractive in comparison with “Emran-
Stiglitz model” and “Ligthart-Meijden model” from the point of the verification of its 
parameters: data for parameterization are substantially more available that data 
needed for parameterization of “Emran-Stiglitz model” and “Ligthart- Meijden 
model”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. 
Values of commodity flows 
 Value Label 
1 Finished products value (high processing) made from domestic raw 
materials and then exported 
 
2 Domestic raw materials export value (law processing)  
3 Value of goods made from the imported raw materials and then 
exported 
 
4 Value of products made from domestic raw materials and then 
consumed in country 
 
5 Value of goods made from the imported raw materials and then 
consumed in country 
 
6 Value of goods imported for domestic consumption, not requiring the 
further processing 
 
7 Value of imported raw materials*  
*To simplify the calculation it is assumed that there no re-export of raw materials 
For Ukrainian economy , ,  and  values define as the total for 
all commodity flows (which are and are not subject to trade tax) in formal and 
informal sectors: 
  (1) 
  (2) 
  (3) 
   (4) 
where  defines the value of commodity 
flow; 
the f and i indexes define the belonging to formal and informal sectors agreeably; 
 + and – indexes define the payment and non-payment of taxes agreeably in the 
sectors. 
Define  as the weight of domestic raw materials for producing goods which 
will be consumed in country;  as the weight of domestic raw materials for producing 
finished products which will be exported;  as the weight of domestic raw materials 
(law processing) which are exported. It’s obvious that . 
Then assume that the final goods are sold at the same prices in the country and 
outside (export). 
Then 
  (5) 
The total value of imported goods ( ): 
        (6) 
During the processing of imported raw materials inside the country for  and 
 sectors the added value  is creating ( ). Then  and  can be written as 
 
      (7) 
where  and  are the coefficients, determining the amount of imported raw 
materials for  and  agreeably ( )
 5
;  is the added cost, which appears 
during the domestic processing of imported raw materials ( ). 
We can formalize the total output (С) as: 
,   (8) 
that we can rewrite taking into consideration the correlations (2)-(3) as: 
  (9) 
or 
.  (10) 
The equations (5)-(10) describe the model of influence of trade tax rates 
changes on commodity flows in external trade and home economy. 
It should be noted that since at the present stage in Ukraine the informal 
activity touches all branches of economy, the equations, defining the price of 
production in formal and informal economy, will be absolutely identical with regard 
to parameters. 
IV Quantitative evaluation of the model 
There were tariff cuts in trade liberalization. The standard situation is described 
by the simultaneous cuts in export (tх) and import duties (tm), which is considered 
further. 
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 The values of total added value by branches of economy are the official data, prepared by 
Ukrainian State Statistical Committee. 
Influence of import tariff cuts on value of commodity flows 
The import tariff cuts leads to increase of import of goods –  and . It’s 
assumed, that the increase of  does not lead to decrease of  and  
( , i.e. those parameters do not depend from each other (there 
are no substitution effect). 
The increase of  leads to the increase  and . It is also assumed that 
there no substitution effect between  and  (domestic raw materials are not 
imported, consequently  and  use different production facilities and there is 
no competition). Similarly, for  и . 
Influence of export duty cuts on value of commodity flow 
Export duties reduction does not affect , (in Ukraine there are no export duty 
on final products). There is no direct influence on . 
Export duty cuts leads to the increase of . 
However in the conditions of limited resources the increase of raw materials 
export one day can result in reducing of domestic raw material base (needed for 
production of final goods). This statement is based on the law of diminishing 
marginal utility; its empirical verification for Ukraine has been made in Vishnevskyy 
and Luk’yanenko (2006). 
So, the export duty cuts can cause reduction of  and  (table 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Influence of trade tax cuts on values of commodity flows 
  
↓  → ↑  ↓  → ↑  
↓  → ↑  ↓  → ↓  
↓  → ↑  ↓  → ↓  
↓  →  =0 ↓  →  
↓  →  =0 ↓  →  
 
The change of volume of commodity flow due to change of trade tax ( ) 
can be defined knowing commodity flow trade tax rate elasticity, namely, since the 
commodity flow elasticity  with regard to trade tax rate can be defined as 
      (11) 
where  is the trade tax rate change, unit fraction; 
then . 
A new value of commodity flow after the trade tax change ( ) can be 
calculated according to the formula (12) for each sector; the results are in the table 3. 
 (12) 
where  is the value of commodity flow at the initial trade tax rate, unit fraction. 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
New value of commodity flows after trade tax cuts (by sectors) 
New value of commodity flows after 
trade tax cuts (in formal sector) 
New value of commodity flows after 
trade tax cuts (in the informal sector) 
) ) 
) ) 
  
  
  
  
  
 
The state budget constraint  gives: 
      (13) 
where  denotes the total state tax revenues proceeded from the tax collection in all 
sectors;  denotes the trade tax rate, unit fraction;  denotes the real VAT rate, 
unit fraction. 
Some further assumptions and also values of parameters are calculated 
according to formulae, presented in Appendix B. 
In order to calculate the elasticities, the commodity flows were analyzed, in 
particular, the analysis concerned the goods, the export duties on which suffered 
changes (notably, the ferrous scrap and sunflower seeds). The findings were adjusted 
taking into account the changes of other factors (changes of sunflowers crop acres, 
the international prices of sunflower seeds; the ferrous scrap supply to Ukrainian 
metallurgical plants, export and international prices of ferrous scrap etc.). 
Concerning the calculation of price elasticity it should be noted the following. 
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine monthly issues an 
instruction in order to set the export prices for some types of goods. Basing on that 
data the changes of prices and changes of export volumes were analyzed. For further 
calculations the weighted average of obtained values were used
6
. 
The given model does not provide the securely fix values of elasticities; as 
mentioned above, the data for any good and for any period of time can be used. In 
this case the values of elasticities reflect only the direction (sign) of commodity flows 
changing (in consequence of changing of trade taxes and prices). 
According to the statement of the Head of Customs administration of Ukraine 
in 2011, there is no official data on the level of smuggling in Ukraine; only the 
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 According to the WTO rules, the minimum export prices, which are now set by Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, should be cancelled. The custom valuation of such 
goods will be provided taking into account the listings of international exchanges. 
detected injury can be evaluated. Relevant to such evaluation, in 2010 the level of 
smuggling attained 45% of volume of foreign trade. 
On the ground of data of Customs administration of Ukraine about export duty 
rates, number of commodity items, for which the same import duty rates are 
established, and quantity of goods, which is subject to export duty, it was calculated 
the weight-average import duty rates ( ) and export duty rates ( ). In 2010 in 
Ukraine the average weighted import tariff was about 7%, and the average weighted 
export duty – about 29%. 
For estimating the trade taxes and VAT influence on agents’ activity and state 
tax revenue, it was realized a number of computational experiments using proposed 
economic-mathematical model. 
1. Scenario, characterizing the initial conditions of Ukrainian economy. 
2. Scenario with different easiness level of opportunistic behavior of agents 
(depending on tax rate). 
3. Scenario when the informal sector size is not influenced by tax rates. 
1. Scenario characterizing the initial conditions of Ukrainian economy 
There were defined the possible variants of cuts of existing import tariff
7
 and 
appropriate increase of effective VAT rate (by eliminating the tax exemptions and 
preferences) (fig. 1), on which the state tax revenue and agent’ profit will exceed the 
initial values. 
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 At the moment in Ukraine only the raw material are subject to export duty; according to 
calculations, this parameters makes only 3,08% of all export of raw materials, so in further 
calculations the export duty rate is held constant. 
When the tariff is reduced to the 5%, the real VAT rate, wherein the state 
revenue losses will be compensated, should be 22,7% – in that case the rates of 
additions of economic agents’ profit (in formal sector) and state tax revenues will be 
the same (1,09 times). On fig. 1. that is the common point of intersection of right 
lines, which reflect the changes of economic agents’ profit (in formal sector) and the 
changes of state tax revenues (at the import tariff rate of 5%). 
The direct rising of the nominal VAT rate is not provided; but the rising of real 
VAT rate, according to the World Bank and IMF recommendations, should be 
provided by eliminating the VAT exemptions and preferences. 
When the tariff is reduced to the 1%, the real VAT rate, wherein the state 
revenue losses will be compensated, should be 24% – in that case the rates of 
additions of economic agents’ profit (in formal sector) and state tax revenues will be 
the same (1,17 times). On fig. 1. that is the common point of intersection of right 
lines, which reflect the changes of economic agents’ profit (in formal sector) and the 
changes of state tax revenues (at the import tariff rate of 1%). 
If the goal of tax-tariff reform provides only the maximization of state tax 
revenue, then on fig. 2 there are represented the all possible variants of compensation 
of state tax revenue losses, which exceed the initial value. 
 
 Fig.1. The result of estimation of tax-tariff reform in Ukraine: changes of state 
tax revenue and profit of economic agents’ (in formal sector) at the different rates of 
import tariff and VAT. 
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Fig. 2. The result of estimation of tax-tariff reform in Ukraine: changes of state 
tax revenue at the different rates of import tariff and VAT. 
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2. Scenario with different easiness level of opportunistic behavior of agents 
(depending on tax rate) 
Here it was defined, specifically, on which trade tax and VAT rates the 
maximum of state tax revenues and agents’ profit would be achieved. 
It should be noted that the investigation of scenario is the principal for testing 
the given hypothesis concerning the compensation of state tax revenue losses from 
trade tax cuts (those losses are provided to be compensated by rising of real VAT 
rate) depending on tax rates elasticity of the informal sector size. 
In this case tax rates elasticity takes an account the barriers for shifting into the 
informal sector, which takes place due to rising of tax rate. 
Calculations showed that, if the barriers for economic agent’ shifting into the 
informal sector are practically absent, the maximum of state tax revenues and profit 
of economic agents (in formal sector) can be reached at the minimum VAT rate – 
5%, and the maximum import tariff rate – 15%, as can be seen from fig. 3.a, i.e., in 
this case . 
 
  
a) 
barriers for shifting into informal sector 
are minimum 
b) 
barriers for shifting into informal sector 
are substantial 
Fig. 3. State tax revenues and profit of economic agents (in formal sector) for 
the case with different VAT and trade tax elasticity of informal sector 
sizes 
– state tax revenues, USD billions; 
 – profit of economic agents (in formal sector), USD billions; 
 – state tax revenues, USD billions; 
 – profit of economic agents (in formal sector), USD billions; 
 – import tariff rate, unit fraction; 
 – real VAT rate, unit fraction. 
 
Fig. 3.b presents the significant barriers for shifting into the informal sector. In 
this case, conversely, the maximum of state tax revenues and profit of economic 
agents (in formal sector) can be reached at the maximum VAT rate – 30%, and the 
minimum import tariff rate – 1%, i.e., in this case . 
Taking into account all foresaid it can be noted, that the suggested hypothesis 
is confirmed. It means, that it is reasonable to compensate the state tax revenue losses 
from trade tax cuts (through rising of VAT rate) in the case, where are the significant 
barriers for shifting into informal sector. 
3. Scenario of calculation when the informal sector size is not influenced by tax 
rates. 
In this case the profit of economic agents (in formal sector) nowise depends on 
real VAT rate; it depends only on informal sector size. So, only the total state tax 
revenues, which exceed the initial values at different informal sector sizes, can be 
defined. 
According to the estimations of National Institute for Strategic Studies in 2010 
the size of informal sector in Ukraine was about 38%. In this case the maximum state 
tax revenues and minimum profits of economic agents (in informal sector) can be 
achieved at real VAT rate of 30% and import tariff rate 1% (Appendix D). 
With the purpose of making the concrete guidelines for Ukrainian tax-tariff 
policy, basing on expected research results, the country’s economy is structured by 
branches according to their tax rates elasticity in different commodity markets 
(perfect competition, oligopoly and monopoly). 
VAT base enlargement in consequence of trade tax cuts is able to entail the 
price increase in retail trade. On markets, which characterize the situation, similar to 
perfect competition, this may lead to decrease in demand for goods, supplied by new 
prices; a part of economic agents will prefer to shift into informal sector (fig. 4), but 
do not reduce their production output. 
 
Fig. 4. Impact of tax base enlargement on production output in conditions of 
perfect competition 
Legend: 
S
f
 is supply in formal sector; D
f
 is demand in formal sector; Q
f
 is production 
output in formal sector; P
f
 is prices in formal sector; S
i
 is supply in informal sector; D
i
 
is demand in informal sector; Q
i
 is production output in informal sector; P
i
 is prices in 
informal sector. 
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Before tax base enlargement the equilibrium in formal sector is in e
1
. 
Commodity price in formal sector (P
1
) represents the lower bound of commodity 
supply in informal sector and the upper bound of their demand in informal sector. 
Production output in formal sector is Q
f
1. The demand in informal sector depends 
directly of commodity price in this sector (P
i
), which depends on risk premium. 
After tax base enlargement the commodity price in formal sector will increase 
(P
2
 >P
1
). As a result, on the assumption of elastic supply in formal sector (i.e. tax 
base enlargement is proportionate to decrease in supply), this later will decrease to S
/f
. 
A new equilibrium in formal sector will be in e
2
, where P
2
 >P
1
 and Q
f
1>Q
f
2. 
Economic agents will use the variation in prices (P
2
>P
*
) in their own interests 
(P
*
 is untaxed commodity price in formal sector). They shift a part of their production 
into informal sector. P
2
 is the upper bound of demand (D
i/
)
 
in informal sector. In this 
situation the equilibrium in informal sector will be in e
/1
; production output in this 
sector will be Q
i
1. 
In case of inelastic supply in formal sector (i.e. tax base enlargement is 
disproportionate to decrease in supply), the situation is similar. A new equilibrium 
will be in e
3
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1 
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in informal 
sector. 
As for monopoly and oligopoly markets, the tax base enlargement, which will 
compel the economic agents to reduce their production or to increase prices, most 
likely will lead to rise in prices, since the consumers will purchase the commodity on 
new prices. 
Conclusion 
The given investigation testified the incapability to give a unique estimate of 
adequacy of tax-tariff reform (recommended by IMF and the World Bank in 
Ukraine), which provides the compensation of state tax revenue losses from trade tax 
cuts by broadening the VAT base (eliminating the VAT exemptions and preferences). 
It was estimated the influence of foreign trade taxation on commodity flows, 
on economic agents’ profit and on state tax revenues, taking into account the informal 
sector of economy and the pattern of foreign trade. It is established that it is expedient 
to cut the trade tax rates with compensation of state tax revenue losses by VAT base 
enlargement according to the tax rates elasticity of informal sector size. I.e., the easier 
is the shift into the informal sector, the less degree the trade tax should be cut (and 
the less should be the enlargement of VAT base). 
Therefore, providing the trade liberalization by way of substitution of trade tax 
revenues by enlarged VAT is expedient in those branches of economy, which are 
characterized by monopoly and oligopoly situation. For instance in Ukraine among 
such branches are mining and smelting industries, chemical industry, spirit industry, 
medical industry etc. On the contrary, in Ukrainian branches of economy, 
characterizing by the situation, similar to perfect competition (iron and steel scrap 
market, agriculture, in particular, the oil seeds market, foodstuffs production etc.), the 
trade taxes cuts with subsequent VAT base enlargement may result to shifting of 
many economic agents into the informal sector; and realization of this reform will not 
lead to expected results.  
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 Appendix A 
Table A.1 
Input data, USD, millions 
Main figures         
1. Formal sector         
Value of goods, which are subject to “cross-border” taxes (trade 
taxes and VAT) 
15292,6 0,0 322,0 9268,3 – 13902,5 21654,9 36947,5 
Value of goods, which are not subject to “cross-border” taxes (trade 
taxes and VAT) 
1329,8 9687,0 17568,0 189,1 – 283,7 441,9 1771,7 
Total (in formal sector) 16622,4 9687,0 17890,0 9457,4 16145,0 14186,2 22096,8 38719,3 
2. Informal sector         
Value of goods, which are subject to “cross-border” taxes (trade 
taxes and VAT) 
6789,4 0,0 131,5 3785,6 – 5678,5 8845,0 15634,4 
Value of goods, which are not subject to “cross-border” taxes (trade 
taxes and VAT) 
0,0 3956,7 7175,7 77,3 – 115,9 180,5 180,5 
Total (in informal sector) 6789,4 3956,7 7307,2 3862,9 6594,4 5794,4 9025,5 15814,9 
Total (in economy) 23411,9 13643,7 25197,2 13320,4 22739,5 19980,5 31122,3 54534,2 
Elasticity of commodity flows (as a result of trade tax changes)  –0,4  –0,4    –0,3  
Price elasticity of commodity flows 
* 
0,7 0,7 0,5    0,6  
*For goods, which are not subject to trade taxes, it is used the price elasticity of commodity flows 
 Appendix B  
Estimation of model parameters for changed tax rates 
Notations: 
 is the value of goods imported for domestic consumption, not requiring the 
further processing; 
 is the value of imported raw materials; 
 is the value of goods made from the imported raw materials and then exported; 
 is the value of products made from domestic raw materials and then consumed 
in country; 
 is the value of goods made from the imported raw materials and then consumed 
in country; 
The f and i indexes define the belonging to formal and informal sectors agreeably; 
mt  is the new import tariff rate, unit fraction ( mmm
ttt ); 
xt  is the export duty rate, unit fraction. ( xxx ttt ); 
v  is the new VAT rate, unit fraction. ( vvv ); 
Taxation after changing tax rates 
TV is the amount of taxes, paid to the state budget by economic agents 
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In Ukrainian economy fX  is not subject to export duty (i.e. 0x
f tX ). 
There are no VAT liabilities, since the according to the generally accepted destination 
principle 0xv . Hence 
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In Ukrainian economy 0x
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If economic agent do not pay VAT, but requires the compensation from the state, 
his profit grow to the VAT amount indicated in appropriate documentation: 
.
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v
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I.e. the sum to be compensated from state budget is calculated according VAT 
rate, applied for a flow, which contain this tax. 
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In Ukrainian economy 0x
i tX . If there is an illegally compensated VAT, 
the economic agent’s profit raises on the following amount: 
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– if economic agent does not pay domestic VAT. 
State tax revenues 
fDS are the state tax revenues, collected in formal sector after changing the tax 
rates; 
iDS  are the state tax revenues, collected in informal sector after changing the tax 
rates; 
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Profit of economic agent after changing the tax rates  
V is the value of goods of sector, in which economic agent operates, USD mln.; 
r denotes the profitability of economic agent, unit fraction. 
PE  is the profit of economic agent 
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Total profit for all commodity flows gives 
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Appendix C 
Equation to estimate the profit of economic agents and the state tax 
revenues for 1 variant  
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 8611745 1363,9 6314,0 0,000101 8594415 8629075 8611745 1363,9 8594415 8629075 
(1) IM 3463551 2727,8 1269,7 0,000501 3428891 3498211 1731775 1363,9 1714445 1749106 
(2) EX 138225 2727,8 50,7 0,012562 103565 172885 69112 1363,9 51782 86443 
(3) VAT 11338175 2727,8 4156,5 0,000153 11303515 11372835 5669087 1363,9 5651757 5686418 
1 by 2 18316 2727,8 6,7 0,094122 –16345 52976 9158 1363,9 –8172 26488 
1 by 3 453253 2727,8 166,2 0,003831 418593 487913 226627 1363,9 209296 243957 
2 by 3 –22122 2727,8 –8,1 0,078106 –56782 12538 –11061 1363,9 –28391 6269 
profit of economic agent in informal sector PE
i+ 
vtvttPE mxm
i 12038759047166916016547368969062  
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 12421265 596,5 20822,4 0,000031 12413685 12428844 12421265 596,53 12413685 12428844 
(1) IM –4992428 1193,1 –4184,5 0,000152 –5007587 –4977268 –2496214 596,53 –2503793 –2488634 
(2) EX –111096 1193,1 –93,1 0,006836 –126255 –95937 –55548 596,53 –63128 –47968 
(3) VAT –5884203 1193,1 –4932,0 0,000129 –5899362 –5869043 –2942101 596,53 –2949681 –2934522 
1 by 2 –1667 1193,1 –1,4 0,395491 –16826 13493 –833 596,53 –8413 6746 
1 by 3 645537 1193,1 541,1 0,001177 630378 660696 322768 596,53 315189 330348 
2 by 3 35139 1193,1 29,5 0,021607 19979 50298 17569 596,53 9990 25149 
 
  
profit of economic agent in formal sector PE
f+
 
vtvtvttPE xmxm
f 23674345852331405378794273772614332379  
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 21033010 767,4 27409,0 0,000023 21023260 21042760 21033010 767,38 21023260 21042760 
(1) IM –1528877 1534,8 –996,2 0,000639 –1548378 –1509376 –764438 767,38 –774189 –754688 
(2) EX 27129 1534,8 17,7 0,035977 7628 46630 13564 767,38 3814 23315 
(3) VAT 5453972 1534,8 3553,7 0,000179 5434471 5473473 2726986 767,38 2717236 2736737 
1 by 2 16649 1534,8 10,8 0,058521 –2852 36150 8324 767,38 –1426 18075 
1 by 3 1098790 1534,8 715,9 0,000889 1079289 1118291 549395 767,38 539645 559145 
2 by 3 13017 1534,8 8,5 0,074717 –6484 32518 6508 767,38 –3242 16259 
total profit of economic agents PE
+
 
vtvtPE mm 4662382590663108299023301441 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. –1180357 2411,40 –489,49 0,001301 –1210996 –1149717 –1180357 2411,40 –1210996 –1149717 
(1) IM 106197 4822,81 22,02 0,028892 44917 167476 53098 2411,40 22459 83738 
(2) EX 23260 4822,81 4,82 0,130156 –38020 84539 11630 2411,40 –19010 42270 
(3) VAT –2628728 4822,81 –545,06 0,001168 –2690008 –2567449 –1314364 2411,40 –1345004 –1283724 
1 by 2 11507 4822,81 2,39 0,252653 –49772 72787 5754 2411,40 –24886 36394 
1 by 3 –304700 4822,81 –63,18 0,010076 –365980 –243420 –152350 2411,40 –182990 –121710 
2 by 3 8154 4822,81 1,69 0,340022 –53125 69434 4077 2411,40 –26563 34717 
 
  
state tax revenues, collected in informal sector TV
i+
 
vtvTV m
i 16138313564661286630 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 6926012 2569,31 2695,67 0,000236 6893366 6958658 6926012 2569,31 6893366 6958658 
(1) IM 1340021 5138,62 260,77 0,002441 1274729 1405314 670011 2569,31 637364 702657 
(2) EX 66782 5138,62 13,00 0,048889 1490 132074 33391 2569,31 745 66037 
(3) VAT 4200571 5138,62 817,45 0,000779 4135279 4265863 2100285 2569,31 2067639 2132932 
1 by 2 –30321 5138,62 –5,90 0,106876 –95613 34972 –15160 2569,31 –47806 17486 
1 by 3 –2200563 5138,62 –428,24 0,001487 –2265856 –2135271 –1100282 2569,31 –1132928 –1067635 
2 by 3 –37263 5138,62 –7,25 0,087240 –102556 28029 –18632 2569,31 –51278 14015 
state tax revenues, collected in formal sector TV
f+
 
vtvtvtt
f
TV xmxm 373991194280324594145055922488379693 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 5745655 157,90 36386,90 0,000017 5743649 5747662 5745655 157,90 5743649 5747662 
(1) IM 1446218 315,81 4579,41 0,000139 1442205 1450231 723109 157,90 721103 725115 
(2) EX 90042 315,81 285,11 0,002233 86029 94054 45021 157,90 43014 47027 
(3) VAT 1571843 315,81 4977,19 0,000128 1567830 1575855 785921 157,90 783915 787928 
1 by 2 –18813 315,81 –59,57 0,010686 –22826 –14800 –9407 157,90 –11413 –7400 
1 by 3 –2505263 315,81 –7932,84 0,000080 –2509276 –2501251 –1252632 157,90 –1254638 –1250625 
2 by 3 –29109 315,81 –92,17 0,006907 –33122 –25096 –14554 157,90 –16561 –12548 
total state tax revenues TV
+
 
vtvtvttTV xmxm 265441355663188947566188735077093062
/
 
  
. 
Equation to estimate the profit of economic agents and the state tax 
revenues for 2 variant  
If there are no barriers for shifting into the informal sector: 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 14093371 262965,5 53,594 0,011877 10752077 17434664 14093371 262965,5 10752077 17434664 
(1) IM 5028652 525931,0 9,561 0,066341 –1653934 11711239 2514326 262965,5 –826967 5855619 
(2) EX 670110 525931,0 1,274 0,423626 –6012476 7352697 335055 262965,5 –3006238 3676348 
(3) VAT 15109437 525931,0 28,729 0,022151 8426850 21792024 7554719 262965,5 4213425 10896012 
1 by 2 –510471 525931,0 –0,971 0,509496 –7193057 6172116 –255235 262965,5 –3596529 3086058 
1 by 3 –2570738 525931,0 –4,888 0,128469 –9253324 4111849 –1285369 262965,5 –4626662 2055924 
2 by 3 –579736 525931,0 –1,102 0,469045 –7262322 6102851 –289868 262965,5 –3631161 3051426 
profit of economic agent in informal sector PE
i+ 
vPEi 788889614690897 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 8934597 226816,4 39,39 0,016158 6052621 11816573 8934597 226816,4 6052621 11816573 
(1) IM –5766595 453632,9 –12,71 0,049977 –11530547 –2643 –2883297 226816,4 –5765274 –1321 
(2) EX –556431 453632,9 –1,23 0,435431 –6320383 5207522 –278215 226816,4 –3160192 2603761 
(3) VAT –7468141 453632,9 –16,46 0,038622 –13232093 –1704188 –3734070 226816,4 –6616046 –852094 
1 by 2 450728 453632,9 0,99 0,502045 –5313224 6214680 225364 226816,4 –2656612 3107340 
1 by 3 3049970 453632,9 6,72 0,093998 –2713982 8813922 1524985 226816,4 –1356991 4406961 
2 by 3 504996 453632,9 1,11 0,465923 –5258956 6268948 252498 226816,4 –2629478 3134474 
 
  
profit of economic agent in formal sector PE
f+
 
vPE f 419962410400517 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 23027968 36149,04 637,03 0,000999 22568651 23487285 23027968 36149,04 22568651 23487285 
(1) IM –737943 72298,09 –10,21 0,062173 –1656577 180692 –368971 36149,04 –828288 90346 
(2) EX 113680 72298,09 1,57 0,360618 –804955 1032314 56840 36149,04 –402477 516157 
(3) VAT 7641297 72298,09 105,69 0,006023 6722662 8559931 3820648 36149,04 3361331 4279965 
1 by 2 –59743 72298,09 –0,83 0,560353 –978377 858892 –29871 36149,04 –489189 429446 
1 by 3 479232 72298,09 6,63 0,095323 –439402 1397867 239616 36149,04 –219701 698933 
2 by 3 –74739 72298,09 –1,03 0,489431 –993374 843895 –37370 36149,04 –496687 421947 
total profit of economic agents PE
+
 
vtPE m 368927281478625091414 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. –1742294 19067,70 –91,37 0,006967 –1984572 –1500016 –1742294 19067,7 –1984572 –1500016 
(1) IM 619067 38135,40 16,23 0,039167 134511 1103624 309534 19067,7 67256 551812 
(2) EX 19856 38135,40 0,52 0,694387 –464700 504413 9928 19067,7 –232350 252206 
(3) VAT –4139290 38135,40 –108,54 0,005865 –4623846 –3654734 –2069645 19067,7 –2311923 –1827367 
1 by 2 41938 38135,40 1,10 0,469789 –442618 526494 20969 19067,7 –221309 263247 
1 by 3 –303860 38135,40 –7,97 0,079482 –788416 180696 –151930 19067,7 –394208 90348 
2 by 3 42741 38135,40 1,12 0,463784 –441815 527297 21371 19067,7 –220907 263649 
 
  
state tax revenues, collected in informal sector TV
i+
 
vTV i 21042311925164 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 4263084 28895,29 147,54 0,004315 3895934 4630233 4263084 28895,3 3895934 4630233 
(1) IM 337857 57790,58 5,85 0,107850 –396442 1072155 168928 28895,3 –198221 536078 
(2) EX –37750 57790,58 –0,65 0,631632 –772049 696549 –18875 28895,3 –386024 348275 
(3) VAT 1317350 57790,58 22,80 0,027910 583051 2051649 658675 28895,3 291526 1025825 
1 by 2 37668 57790,58 0,65 0,632265 –696631 771967 18834 28895,3 –348316 385983 
1 by 3 –1139842 57790,58 –19,72 0,032249 –1874140 –405543 –569921 28895,3 –937070 –202771 
2 by 3 43512 57790,58 0,75 0,589146 –690787 777811 21756 28895,3 –345394 388905 
state tax revenues, collected in formal sector TV
f+
 
vtv
f
TV m56235312558755133349 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 2520790 47962,99 52,56 0,012111 1911362 3130218 2520790 47962,99 1911362 3130218 
(1) IM 956924 95925,98 9,98 0,063605 –261931 2175779 478462 47962,99 –130966 1087890 
(2) EX –17893 95925,98 –0,19 0,882600 –1236748 1200962 –8947 47962,99 –618374 600481 
(3) VAT –2821940 95925,98 –29,42 0,021632 –4040795 –1603085 –1410970 47962,99 –2020398 –801542 
1 by 2 79606 95925,98 0,83 0,559020 –1139249 1298461 39803 47962,99 –569625 649230 
1 by 3 –1443701 95925,98 –15,05 0,042238 –2662557 –224846 –721851 47962,99 –1331278 –112423 
2 by 3 86253 95925,98 0,90 0,533770 –1132602 1305108 43126 47962,99 –566301 652554 
 
  
total state tax revenues TV
+
 
vTV 8883563208185 . 
 
If there are significant barriers for shifting into the informal sector: 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 7775857 47,07 165211,0 0,000004 7775259 7776455 7775857 47,06623 7775259 7776455 
(1) IM 88166 94,13 936,6 0,000680 86970 89362 44083 47,06623 43485 44681 
(2) EX 34755 94,13 369,2 0,001724 33559 35951 17377 47,06623 16779 17975 
(3) VAT 3227773 94,13 34289,7 0,000019 3226577 3228969 1613886 47,06623 1613288 1614484 
1 by 2 –256 94,13 –2,7 0,224099 –1452 940 –128 47,06623 –726 470 
1 by 3 153709 94,13 1632,9 0,000390 152513 154905 76855 47,06623 76257 77453 
2 by 3 1931 94,13 20,5 0,031009 735 3127 966 47,06623 367 1564 
profit of economic agent in informal sector PE
i+ 
vtvttPE mxm
i 38539168819015625895738133458 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 12462017 10,78 1155584 0,000001 12461880 12462154 12462017 10,78417 12461880 12462154 
(1) IM –2786046 21,57 –129173 0,000005 –2786320 –2785772 –1393023 10,78417 –1393160 –1392886 
(2) EX –37945 21,57 –1759 0,000362 –38219 –37671 –18973 10,78417 –19110 –18836 
(3) VAT –533834 21,57 –24751 0,000026 –534108 –533560 –266917 10,78417 –267054 –266780 
1 by 2 1993 21,57 92 0,006891 1719 2267 996 10,78417 859 1133 
1 by 3 28905 21,57 1340 0,000475 28631 29179 14453 10,78417 14316 14590 
2 by 3 439 21,57 20 0,031284 165 713 219 10,78417 82 356 
 
  
profit of economic agent in formal sector PE
f+
 
;60014662
121430075037759149409514384986
vtvt
ttvttPE
xm
xmxm
f
 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 20237874 57,85 349831,3 0,000002 20237139 20238609 20237874 57,85 20237139 20238609 
(1) IM –2697880 115,70 –23317,7 0,000027 –2699350 –2696410 –1348940 57,85 –1349675 –1348205 
(2) EX –3190 115,70 –27,6 0,023077 –4661 –1720 –1595 57,85 –2330 –860 
(3) VAT 2693938 115,70 23283,7 0,000027 2692468 2695409 1346969 57,85 1346234 1347704 
1 by 2 1736 115,70 15,0 0,042358 266 3206 868 57,85 133 1603 
1 by 3 182615 115,70 1578,3 0,000403 181145 184085 91307 57,85 90572 92042 
2 by 3 2370 115,70 20,5 0,031060 899 3840 1185 57,85 450 1920 
total profit of economic agents PE
+
 
;615503202
795136743922134158366922518444
vtvt
ttvttPE
xm
xmxm
 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. –790492 138,09 –5724,28 0,000111 –792247 –788738 –790492 138,09 –792247 –788738 
(1) IM 529325 276,19 1916,53 0,000332 525815 532834 264662 138,09 262908 266417 
(2) EX 26157 276,19 94,71 0,006722 22647 29666 13078 138,09 11324 14833 
(3) VAT –1740122 276,19 –6300,46 0,000101 –1743631 –1736612 –870061 138,09 –871816 –868306 
1 by 2 1608 276,19 5,82 0,108319 –1902 5117 804 138,09 –951 2558 
1 by 3 –246667 276,19 –893,11 0,000713 –250176 –243158 –123334 138,09 –125088 –121579 
2 by 3 1311 276,19 4,75 0,132196 –2198 4820 655 138,09 –1099 2410 
 
  
state tax revenues, collected in informal sector TV
i+
 
;2056101988
90587098422584201573882111
vtvt
ttvttTV
xm
xmxm
i
 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 8017959 213,58 37541,58 0,000017 8015246 8020673 8017959 213,58 8015246 8020673 
(1) IM 2644511 427,15 6191,05 0,000103 2639084 2649939 1322256 213,58 1319542 1324969 
(2) EX 108684 427,15 254,44 0,002502 103257 114111 54342 213,58 51628 57056 
(3) VAT 7706945 427,15 18042,68 0,000035 7701518 7712373 3853473 213,58 3850759 3856186 
1 by 2 –3025 427,15 –7,08 0,089315 –8452 2403 –1512 213,58 –4226 1201 
1 by 3 –933065 427,15 –2184,39 0,000291 –938492 –927637 –466532 213,58 –469246 –463819 
2 by 3 –8278 427,15 –19,38 0,032821 –13705 –2850 –4139 213,58 –6853 –1425 
state tax revenues, collected in formal sector TV
f+
 
vtvtvttTV xmxm
f 175645121125405250665878895949798323 ; 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(1) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 7227467 75,48 95752,46 0,000007 7226508 7228426 7227467 75,48 7226508 7228426 
(1) IM 3173836 150,96 21024,14 0,000030 3171918 3175754 1586918 75,48 1585959 1587877 
(2) EX 134841 150,96 893,21 0,000713 132922 136759 67420 75,48 66461 68379 
(3) VAT 5966824 150,96 39525,47 0,000016 5964905 5968742 2983412 75,48 2982453 2984371 
1 by 2 –1417 150,96 –9,39 0,067563 –3335 501 –709 75,48 –1668 251 
1 by 3 –1179732 150,96 –7814,79 0,000081 –1181650 –1177814 –589866 75,48 –590825 –588907 
total state tax revenues TV
+
 
vtvtvttTV xmxm 1550961410045342658944110911668916212 . 
  
Equation to estimate the profit of economic agents and the state tax 
revenues for 3 variant  
 
Effect Std.Err. t(5) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 11879793 20222,91 587,44 0,000 11827808 11931778 11879793 20222,9 11827808 11931778 
(1) IM –387995 40445,83 –9,59 0,000 –491964 –284026 –193997 20222,9 –245982 –142013 
(2) EX 13079 40445,83 0,32 0,760 –90891 117048 6539 20222,9 –45445 58524 
(3) VAT 3728762 40445,83 92,19 0,000 3624793 3832731 1864381 20222,9 1812396 1916366 
(4) Sh 18479678 40445,83 456,90 0,000 18375709 18583647 9239839 20222,9 9187854 9291824 
1 by 2 0 40445,83 0,00 1,000 –103969 103969 0 20222,9 –51985 51985 
1 by 3 116208 40445,83 2,87 0,035 12238 220177 58104 20222,9 6119 110088 
1 by 4 –301774 40445,83 –7,46 0,001 –405743 –197805 –150887 20222,9 –202872 –98902 
2 by 3 –4088 40445,83 –0,10 0,923 –108058 99881 –2044 20222,9 –54029 49940 
2 by 4 10172 40445,83 0,25 0,811 –93797 114142 5086 20222,9 –46899 57071 
3 by 4 2900148 40445,83 71,70 0,000 2796179 3004118 1450074 20222,9 1398090 1502059 
 
  
profit of economic agent in informal sector PE
i+ 
;14939573182107708
9669497192080240912712432211
hhmm
hm
i
SvStvt
SvtPE
 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(5) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 21555348 20222,9 1065,89 0,00 21503363 21607332 21555348 20222,9 21503363 21607332 
(1) IM –2382175 40445,8 –58,90 0,00 –2486144 –2278205 –1191087 20222,9 –1243072 –1139103 
(2) EX –2738 40445,8 –0,07 0,95 –106708 101231 –1369 20222,9 –53354 50616 
(3) VAT 3728762 40445,8 92,19 0,00 3624793 3832731 1864381 20222,9 1812396 1916366 
(4) Sh 6165336 40445,8 152,43 0,00 6061367 6269305 3082668 20222,9 3030683 3134653 
1 by 2 0 40445,8 0,00 1,00 –103969 103969 0 20222,9 –51985 51985 
1 by 3 116208 40445,8 2,87 0,03 12238 220177 58104 20222,9 6119 110088 
1 by 4 967250 40445,8 23,91 0,00 863280 1071219 483625 20222,9 431640 535609 
2 by 3 –4088 40445,8 –0,10 0,92 –108058 99881 –2044 20222,9 –54029 49940 
2 by 4 20237 40445,8 0,50 0,64 –83732 124207 10119 20222,9 –41866 62103 
3 by 4 2900148 40445,8 71,70 0,00 2796179 3004118 1450074 20222,9 1398090 1502059 
 
  
total profit of economic agents PE
+
 
;1493957160813594097708
2733705192080218675147395723679016
hhxhmm
hxm
SvStStvt
SvttPE
 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(5) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. –1159665 63609,0 –18,23 0,00 –1323177 –996153 –1159665 63608,98 –1323177 –996153 
(1) IM 890278 127218,0 7,00 0,00 563254 1217302 445139 63608,98 281627 608651 
(2) EX 44030 127218,0 0,35 0,74 –282994 371054 22015 63608,98 –141497 185527 
(3) VAT –2552845 127218,0 –20,07 0,00 –2879869 –2225821 –1276423 63608,98 –1439935 –1112910 
(4) Sh –1803924 127218,0 –14,18 0,00 –2130948 –1476899 –901962 63608,98 –1065474 –738450 
1 by 2 0 127218,0 0,00 1,00 –327024 327024 0 63608,98 –163512 163512 
1 by 3 –365722 127218,0 –2,87 0,03 –692746 –38698 –182861 63608,98 –346373 –19349 
1 by 4 692439 127218,0 5,44 0,00 365414 1019463 346219 63608,98 182707 509731 
2 by 3 4088 127218,0 0,03 0,98 –322936 331113 2044 63608,98 –161468 165556 
2 by 4 34246 127218,0 0,27 0,80 –292779 361270 17123 63608,98 –146389 180635 
3 by 4 –1985546 127218,0 –15,61 0,00 –2312570 –1658522 –992773 63608,98 –1156285 –829261 
 
  
state tax revenues, collected in informal sector TV
i+
 
;988665271424144730
101039512711403489731299079
hhmm
hm
i
SvStvt
SvtTV
 
 
Effect Std.Err. t(5) p –95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. –95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 6307507 86789,2 72,68 0,000 6084409 6530606 6307507 86789,18 6084409 6530606 
(1) IM 2159968 173578,4 12,44 0,000 1713770 2606165 1079984 86789,18 856885 1303082 
(2) EX 93372 173578,4 0,54 0,614 –352826 539569 46686 86789,18 –176413 269784 
(3) VAT 6257869 173578,4 36,05 0,000 5811672 6704067 3128935 86789,18 2905836 3352033 
(4) Sh –8027737 173578,4 –46,25 0,000 –8473934 –7581539 –4013868 86789,18 –4236967 –3790770 
1 by 2 0 173578,4 0,00 1,000 –446197 446197 0 86789,18 –223099 223099 
1 by 3 –609923 173578,4 –3,51 0,017 –1056121 –163726 –304962 86789,18 –528060 –81863 
1 by 4 –1374525 173578,4 –7,92 0,001 –1820722 –928327 –687262 86789,18 –910361 –464164 
2 by 3 0 173578,4 0,00 1,000 –446197 446197 0 86789,18 –223099 223099 
2 by 4 –59418 173578,4 –0,34 0,746 –505616 386779 –29709 86789,18 –252808 193390 
3 by 4 –3982280 173578,4 –22,94 0,000 –4428478 –3536083 –1991140 86789,18 –2214239 –1768041 
 
  
state tax revenues, collected in formal sector TV
f+
 
;2777438481631334942
490941343645467568497714793
hhmm
hm
f
SvStvt
SvtTV
 
 Effect Std.Err. t(5) p -95,% +95,% Coeff. Std.Err. -95,% +95,% 
Mean/Interc. 5147842 23195,09 221,94 0,000 5088217 5207467 5147842 23195,09 5088217 5207467 
(1) IM 3050246 46390,17 65,75 0,000 2930996 3169495 1525123 23195,09 1465498 1584748 
(2) EX 137402 46390,17 2,96 0,031 18152 256651 68701 23195,09 9076 128326 
(3) VAT 3705024 46390,17 79,87 0,000 3585774 3824274 1852512 23195,09 1792887 1912137 
(4) Sh -9831660 46390,17 -211,93 0,000 -9950910 -9712411 -4915830 23195,09 -4975455 -4856205 
1 by 2 0 46390,17 0,00 1,000 -119250 119250 0 23195,09 -59625 59625 
1 by 3 -975645 46390,17 -21,03 0,000 -1094895 -856395 -487823 23195,09 -547447 -428198 
1 by 4 -682086 46390,17 -14,70 0,000 -801336 -562837 -341043 23195,09 -400668 -281418 
2 by 3 4088 46390,17 0,09 0,933 -115161 123338 2044 23195,09 -57581 61669 
2 by 4 -25173 46390,17 -0,54 0,611 -144422 94077 -12586 23195,09 -72211 47039 
3 by 4 -5967827 46390,17 -128,64 0,000 -6087076 -5848577 -2983913 23195,09 -3043538 -2924288 
total state tax revenues TV
+
 
.3766103210207479672
5919808309340611058226415713
hhmm
hm
SvStvt
SvtTV
 
Note: Sh is the variable, denoting the size of normal sector 
 
